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A

s the international situation continued to
deteriorate during the summer of 1939, the
Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) had to think
seriously about how it would fight a war against
Germany. Since the threat to Canada from
German bombers was relatively low, the air force
came to realize that the principal responsibility
for its organization on the east coast, Eastern
Air Command, would be maritime defence and
that this required intimate cooperation with
the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN). 1 Realizing
just how important the assistance given to the
navy was, the Air Officer Commanding Eastern
Air Command, Group Captain N.R. Anderson,
stressed that it was absolutely vital that Eastern
Air Command’s Maritime Patrol Squadrons do
an adequate job of assisting the navy by providing
air coverage for convoys. “Otherwise,” he warned,
“through lack of the necessary cooperation an
attempt may be made by the Navy at some future
date to develop their own Air Arm as had been
done in the United Kingdom and the U.S.A.”2
Indeed, military aviation for use over the sea
had seen a different development in Canada
than it did in Britain or the United States. These
latter countries had developed both maritime
air forces, that is, aircraft under the command
of the country’s respective air forces, as well as
naval air services, which are aircraft under the
command of the navy and which operate largely
from aircraft carriers.

In Canada, though, the development of military
aviation was focused on the growth of a maritime
air force only. Although the last few days of the
First World War had seen the creation of the
navy’s Royal Canadian Naval Air Service, the
war ended before its aircraft could be put into
operation on the east coast, and this naval air
element was soon lost in the budget cuts of the
immediate post-war Canadian Government.3
Instead, responsibility for air coverage over water
in Canada fell to the Canadian Air Force, which
later became the Royal Canadian Air Force. As
a result, by late 1939, maritime air duties on
Canada’s east coast fell to the Royal Canadian
Air Force’s Eastern Air Command.
During the war, the Germans operated their
submarines, known as U-boats, at night and in
groups called “wolf packs” against Allied convoys,
and they did so with much success.4 As shipping
losses continued to rise throughout 1941 and
1942, the Western Allies began to explore options
on how to stem German U-boat attacks. They
all agreed on the need for more air coverage for
convoys. Aircraft were one of the key weapons
employed by the Allies in the war against the
U-boats. Indeed, a U-boat could not surface in
the presence of an enemy aircraft for fear of it
either alerting nearby naval vessels to its presence
or being attacked with air-launched weapons.5
Air coverage for the defence of convoys could
either be in the form of shore-based aircraft,
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commanded by the air force, or aircraft from
naval vessels in the form of small escort carriers.
These vessels were merchant ships fitted with
a flight deck and re-commissioned as auxiliary
aircraft carriers. They played a multitude of
roles, of which perhaps the most important was
to accompany Allied convoys on their voyages
across the North Atlantic.

the first escort carrier, HMS Audacity. This
Royal Navy vessel commenced operations in the
defence of convoys in the autumn of 1941. Almost
immediately she demonstrated her value in the
defence of shipping. While providing protection
for a convoy to Gibraltar, Audacity’s aircraft
fought off German aircraft and also reported and
attacked four U-boats that had been shadowing

HMS Audacity, a Royal Navy escort carrier, proved the value of such a ship in defending
convoys. However, the vessel also displayed the vulnerability of such a high-value target.

Escort carriers could stay with the convoy at all
times and provide immediate air coverage for a
great span of time. The air force’s shore-based
aircraft did not share this advantage due to their
need to travel between their base and the convoy.
This meant a limited number of hours when they
could operate around a convoy. The inclusion of
escort carriers in a convoy also allowed Western
Approaches Command in Britain to route
shipping directly, thereby shortening the voyage,
instead of having it go out of its way to seek the
safety of shore-based air cover.
Escort carriers also had their disadvantages.
Navigational difficulties encountered by shipborne aircraft operating in the cruel North
Atlantic risked “the possibility of high losses
through pilots being unable to return to their
ships.” Other drawbacks included the high cost
of maintaining carriers and their vulnerability to
submarine attack thereby requiring additional
ships tasked specifically to protect the carrier
instead of conducting anti-submarine duties.6
Indeed, such vulnerability was made all the
more apparent by the short wartime career of

the convoy.7 Nonetheless, as a vessel operating
with a convoy, Audacity was also a ripe target
for the German submarines, and she was
subsequently sunk by a U-boat only a couple of
days after she had so effectively driven off the first
attack of German submarines.8 It was with these
issues in mind that the idea for a Royal Canadian
Navy air arm developed.
One of the first individuals to spur serious
thinking on the establishment of an RCN Air
Arm to man escort carriers for convoy defence
was Commander C. Thompson of the Royal
Navy. In September 1942, Thompson, who
was the captain of the escort destroyer HMS
Witherington, circulated a very critical report on
air coverage provided by Eastern Air Command.
Stating that the current efforts by the RCAF
organization left “much to be desired,” Thompson
argued that “experience during this war fully
confirms that air operations over the sea are
far more efficiently carried out by Naval Officers
who have received air training than by Air Force
Officers who are posted for duty in naval cooperation squadrons.”9 One of Thompson’s main
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What Thompson did not appreciate was
that having Naval observers in aircraft would
have a limited effect on the efficiency of Eastern
Right: As Air Officer Commanding the RCAF’s Eastern Air
Command in 1939, Group Captain N.R. Anderson (seen
here as an Air Commodore later in the war) warned his
superiors about the possibility of a navy attempt to wrestle
responsibility for convoy air defence from the RCAF if the
air force did not carry out this role efficiently.
Below: The Air Gap, also known as the “Black Pit,”
consisted of a giant hole in the air cover over the main trade
routes between Britain and North America that stretched
300 miles across from east to west and 600 miles north to
south from Greenland and the Azores Islands. It was here
where U-boats conducted their surface operations against
convoys without fear of aerial attack.
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recommendations was that in order for maritime
air operations in Canada to be successful, “there
needs to be naval influence from top to bottom.”
He stressed that it simply was not enough for the
Navy to have operational control or direction at
the operational headquarters level because it did
not ensure competency at the tactical level, and
he therefore suggested that “there must be Naval
Officers in the aircraft.”10

Canadian Forces Photo Unit (CFPU) PL1181, courtesy of the Shearwater Aviation Museum.
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Air Command operations. At this point in time,
command of the aircraft was vested entirely in
the pilot with the result that the observer, who
was often more capable of making a correct
tactical decision, was left without any executive
responsibility.11 Thompson’s ideal solution was
that a Royal Canadian Navy Air Service be created
to fulfill the role of providing air coverage for
convoys. He did, however, concede that it was
not desirable that the navy should completely
take over the RCAF’s maritime patrol squadrons
for the time being. “After all,” he noted, “we are
aiming at co-operation between the Services, and
this [taking over the air force’s squadrons] will
take it to the extreme.”12

Thompson’s report met with much resentment
from both the RCAF and members from the
staff of the Royal Air Force’s (RAF) maritime air
organization, Coastal Command. Commander
P.B. Martineau, who was a Royal Navy (RN) officer
on the staff of Coastal Command, was dismayed
with Thompson’s suggestions, and stated that “he
was dead against the report.”13 The Air Officer
Commanding Eastern Air Command, by now Air
Vice-Marshal A.A.L. Cuffe, went further, stressing
that “as far as control of the air force’s AntiSubmarine operations is concerned, this seems
to be purely a matter of close cooperation – so
long as that cooperation works smoothly, is there
any need for complete naval control?”14 Thus,
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With additional fuel tanks for added endurance, Very-Long-Range Liberators were the best Maritime
Patrol aircraft utilized by the RAF and RCAF for convoy air coverage in the Mid-Atlantic.

LCMSDS Photograph Collection
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at a joint meeting between air force and naval
officers at Eastern Air Command Headquarters
in Halifax, it was not surprising that the attendees
decided against implementing Thompson’s
version of increased naval command and control
over and input into the air force’s maritime air
operations.15
The RCN did, however, take Thompson’s
recommendation for a Naval Air Arm to heart, as
several officers in Naval Service Headquarters had
for a while been desiring to secure an air element
for their service. One of the main problems of
the air force’s Eastern Air Command was that
it did not have aircraft with sufficient range to
patrol long distances effectively. The result of
this dilemma was that an “Air Gap” existed in the
mid-Atlantic, where U-boats operated free from
fear of Allied aircraft. Although the air force tried
to close the Air Gap by securing Very-Long-Range
B-24 Liberator aircraft, the navy sought to solve
the problem by securing aircraft carriers for its
mid-ocean escort groups. The problem was that
the navy had virtually no officers with experience
in carrier operations – only two regular force
officers had any carrier experience, and neither
had dealt with air operations.16 Consequently,
in April 1943, the Naval Staff tasked the navy’s
Director of Operations Division, Acting Captain
Horatio Nelson Lay, to go on a fact-finding tour
in the United States and Britain to examine the
elements required for and the possibility of the
RCN securing its own Air Arm.17

Shortly thereafter, on 13 May 1943, the Chief
of the Naval Staff, Vice-Admiral Percy W. Nelles,
raised the question of establishing an Air Arm
at a meeting of the Cabinet War Committee. This
immediately drew a guarded response from the
Minister of National Defence for Air, Charles G.
“Chubby” Power. The minister, protective of the
air force’s jurisdiction over air matters, “observed
that a very important question of policy was
involved.” He feared that the creation of such a
new Naval Air Arm would be a drain on the already
strained British Commonwealth Air Training
Plan resources, and that it “would mean two
separate air forces in Canada, with consequent
duplication organizations for headquarters,
supply, repairs, and the rest.” Furthermore,
Power stressed such duplication would also be
“more costly in terms of manpower, money and
materials than development within the RCAF to
meet limited Canadian Naval requirements.”18
Echoing Power’s concern over the financial
implications, the Minister of Finance, J.L. Ilsley,
argued against the duplication that separate
air forces for each service would entail. Isley
instead advocated for the continuation of the
current system of the “provision of air protection
of convoys by co-operation between the navy
and air force.” Finally, the Minister of National
Defence, Colonel J.L. Ralston “expressed doubt
as to whether Canada should assume any further
commitments which made further calls upon
Canadian manpower.” The result was that the

An RAF Coastal Command VLR Liberator.
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Cabinet War Committee deferred decision on the
issue until Lay had completed his report.19

that Captain Lay’s report would put to rest some
of their anxieties.

The RCAF was not alone in being concerned
about the command and control implications of
a Naval Air Arm. The RCN itself, understanding
that “in the final analysis it is the RCAF that have
the say in all matters affecting the air,” feared
that the air force would both “do all in its power
to prevent the division of air authority” and
attempt to dictate “the operation of the aircraft,
the supply of personnel, the maintenance of
the aircraft, supply of aircraft and all the other
factors involved.” At the strategic level, the navy,
understanding that the importance of the escort
carrier operating in convoy escort groups was
growing, feared that if Canada did not secure
carriers, it would mean “a gradual decline both
in the RCN’s strength as an escort service and in
the strength of its strategic control and relations
with the Navies of the UK and the US.”20 The
navy memo continued on, stressing that “only
can actual experience in the operations of such
vessels entitle a Naval Service to voice an opinion
on their operations.”21 Indeed, the RCN hoped

Lay submitted this long-awaited report on
27 August 1943. His first recommendation
was that “a Royal Canadian Naval Air Service
(RCNAS) be established as soon as possible.”
Lay also recommended that “the RCNAS should
be manned by Naval personnel and under the
direct administrative and operational control of
the RCN.”22 This recommendation was based on
Lay’s lack of faith in the concept of co-operation.
He argued that “co-operation between the two
services cannot be as efficient as single control
by one service” and he gave the example of the
years of inter-service infighting between Britain’s
Royal Air Force and Royal Navy over the control
of the Fleet Air Arm in the interwar period
as a reason for complete naval control over a
Canadian Naval Air Service.23 On the other hand,
Lay also recommended that “the Naval Air Service
should concern itself with carrier operations
only” and not with maritime air operations. Such
operations, he stressed, should remain with the
RCAF. Lay’s reasoning for this contention was his

Courtesy of the Shearwater Aviation Museum

In 1943, Naval Service Headquarters in Ottawa tasked Acting Captain Horatio Nelson Lay (seen here, middle, in 1940
as a Lieutenant-Commander with fellow RCN officers H.G. DeWolf and J.C.H. Hibbard) to travel to Britain and the United
States on a fact-finding tour to examine the possibilities of the RCN having its own Air Arm.
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Above: Captain Horatio Nelson Lay would later go on to command the Royal Navy escort carrier HMS Nabob, which
was largely manned by Canadians except for the flight personnel, who were British. While conducting operations off in
the Barents Sea in August 1944, Nabob was heavily damaged by a torpedo from the German submarine U-354.
Below: HMCS Warrior, the RCN’s first light fleet aircraft carrier, was commissioned into the navy shortly after the war.
She carried Seafire and Firefly aircraft from the RCN’s 803 and 825 Squadrons.
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well-founded belief that “in Canada the RCAF is
well established in Coastal operations and it is
considered that it would be more efficient not to
disturb this organization.”24
Because Lay’s report contained no air force
input, the Cabinet War Committee deferred
making a decision on it until a joint air forcenavy Committee had examined the issue.
After some heated discussions between
RCAF and RCN members of this
joint service committee,25 the body
finally submitted its report on the
12th of October 1943. It echoed Lay’s
findings by calling for the creation of
a Naval Air Service to be commanded
by the navy and by confirming that
shore-based aircraft should remain
under the command of the air
force.26
Fo r m e r C a n a d i a n
naval aviator Stewart
Soward has questioned
this arrangement over
maritime air assets.
He called it “highly
dubious” and noted
that “it is remarkable
that no explanation
was ever given to
justify the decision.”27
Such a contention,
however, overlooks the
part of Lay’s report
that explained that it
would not be efficient
to disturb the current
organization of the RCAF’s
Eastern Air Command. In
short, the navy did not favour the
transfer of Eastern Air Command’s Maritime
Patrol squadrons to the Naval Air Service because
it understood that to make wholesale changes in
the middle of a very important campaign against
a deadly enemy risked an administrative chaos
that could potentially cost them final victory
in the Battle of the Atlantic. This was a sound
decision that was in fact made on precedent. In
late 1940, Britain’s Royal Navy had attempted
to secure command over the Royal Air Force’s
maritime air organization, Coastal Command.
However, the British War Cabinet blocked the

navy’s efforts, concluding that to undergo such
changes in the middle of a war would not be a
sound decision.28 It is therefore not surprising
that the Royal Canadian Navy did not secure
command over the air force’s maritime air
squadrons along with a naval air arm in 1943.
In the end, the RCN was able to form its
own air arm, but it was not until shortly after
the conclusion of the war that resources
allowed it to operate aircraft from its
new light fleet carrier, HMCS Warrior.
During the war, the air force could
have attempted to put up greater
resistance in what it might have
viewed as an attempt by the navy to
intrude into air force jurisdiction
over military aviation. However, in
the end the two Canadian services
were able to come up with a
solution that satisfied both
parties: an air arm for the
RCN and the continued
operation of Maritime
Patrol squadrons by the
RCAF.
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